Information Security Summit 2006 Unconventional Malware Detection

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This is not an original idea

"To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself."

- Sun Tzu, 544-496 BC



Why is this important?

- Zero-day malware is not detected by our conventional security infrastructure
- The faster we identify an outbreak, the smaller the impact
- Identifying patient zero helps us reduce our attack surface

It's a dangerous world out there!



Source: Symantec Threat Report, March 2006

The numbers don't lie

- 1,402 Denial of Service (DoS) attacks p/day (up 51%)
- 9,163 New Infected Bots per day
- 1,896 New vulnerabilities (up 40%)
- 10,992 New WIN32 viruses and worms
- 80% of malware threatens confidential data
- 6 Days from vulnerability announcement to appearance of en exploit

Source: Symantec Threat Report, March 2006

Viruses, Worms, Trojans OH MY!

- Viruses replicate with the aid of a user or system
- Worms replicate without intervention
- Trojans are executed by fooling users
- Rootkits are tools that hide malware on a computer
- Spyware are trojans that usually send user data to a third party

How a worm works (Welchia/Nachi)

- 1. Pings random network ranges
- 2. Sends RPCDCOM Attack to responsive hosts
- 3. If the Attack succeeds, uses TFTP to download the worm from the attacking hosts
- 4. Executes the worm
- 5. The worm downloads patches from Microsoft
- 6. Patches system
- 7. Starts scanning for more victims

Detecting Welchia/Nachi

- Anti-Virus
- Detect the PING and RCPDCOM packets
- Volume of network traffic



HTTP download of patches

Source: Nachi worm ICMP traffic on Internet2

What makes malware tick?

- Network propagation
 - E-mail, Scanning, Instant Messaging (IM), Shares
- Control channels
 - IRC, IM, HTTP/HTTPS
- Intellectual Property (IP) Leakage
 - HTTP, FTP

Detecting scanning malware

- LaBrea: A low interaction honeypot
 Written by Tom Liston (http://labrea.sourceforge.net)
- When placed on an unused subnet, will respond to ping and TCP requests as though the subnet is fully populated
- Can dampen the propagation of network based malware
- Logs all traffic via syslog
- Extremely simple configuration
 - A few lines in one text file

IT WORKS!



Detecting e-mail worms

- No network scanning
- Every infected system needs to send e-mail to propagate
- Only authorized mail relays can send e-mail
- Egress filters and logging RULE!
- Simple script to find outbound E-Mailers

% cat fwlogs | grep 'src zone=Trust' | grep 'action=Deny' | grep 'dst_port=25 '

Detecting spyware

- User Agent Strings, every browser has one
- Tcpflow is an open source TCP stream reassembler
 - Written by Jeremy Elson (<u>http://www.circlemud.org/~jelson/software/tcpflow</u>)
- Combine tcpflow with a little perl and you have a User Agent String sniffer

User agents tell tales

- 175 MOZILLA/4.0 (COMPATIBLE; MSIE 6.0; WINDOWS NT 5.0; Q312461; FOO.V1B; FUNWEBPRODUCTS; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
- 75 MOZILLA/4.0 (COMPATIBLE; MSIE 6.0; WINDOWS NT 5.0; Q312461; FUNWEBPRODUCTS; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
- 65 MOZILLA/4.0 (COMPATIBLE; MSIE 6.0; WINDOWS NT 5.0; Q312461; FUNWEBPRODUCTS; FOO.V1B; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
- 65 MOZILLA/4.0 (COMPATIBLE; MSIE 6.0; WINDOWS NT 5.0; Q312461; YPC 3.2.0; FUNWEBPRODUCTS; AMGEN.V1B; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
- 34 MOZILLA/4.0 (COMPATIBLE; MSIE 6.0; WINDOWS NT 5.0; Q312461; FOO.V1B; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; SPAMBLOCKERUTILITY 4.8.0)
- 33 MOZILLA/4.0 (COMPATIBLE; MSIE 6.0; WINDOWS NT 5.1; SV1; FUNWEBPRODUCTS; INFOPATH.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
- 11 MOZILLA/4.0 (COMPATIBLE; MSIE 6.0; WINDOWS NT 5.1; SV1; FUNWEBPRODUCTS; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; INFOPATH.1)
- 5 MOZILLA/4.0 (COMPATIBLE; MSIE 6.0; WINDOWS NT 5.0; Q312461; YPC 3.0.1; FOO.V1B; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
- 4 MOZILLA/4.0 (COMPATIBLE; MSIE 6.0; WINDOWS NT 5.0; Q312461; SBCYDSL 3.12; YCOMP 5.0.0.0; AMGEN.V1B; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
- 2 MOZILLA/5.0 (COMPATIBLE; GNOTIFY 1.0.25.0)
- 2 MOZILLA/4.0 (COMPATIBLE; GOOGLETOOLBAR 3.0.131.0-BIG; WINDOWS 2000 5.0; GOOGLE-TR-3)
- 1 MOZILLA/4.0 (COMPATIBLE; MSIE 6.0; PLAXO_2.8.1.2)
- 1 MOZILLA/4.0 (COMPATIBLE; MONEYCENTRAL; VERSION 15.0.0.513)

Detecting control channels

- Internet Relay Cat (IRC)
- Instant Messenger
- HTTP/HTTPS
- Egress filtering and logs to the rescue again!

Scripts a-go-go

Simple script to find outbound IRC

% cat fwlogs | grep 'src zone=Trust' | grep 'action=Deny' | egrep 'dst_port=666[0-9] '

```
Sep 8 05:44:09 csec1-fw: src=10.10.131.60 dst=195.56.29.202 src port=30076
dst port=6664
Sep 8 11:40:43 tsec1-fw: src=10.10.29.167 dst=207.38.11.136 src port=2252
dst port=6667
Sep 8 11:40:46 tsec1-fw: src=10.10.29.167 dst=207.38.11.136 src port=2252
dst port=6667
Sep 8 11:40:52 tsec1-fw: src=10.10.29.167 dst=207.38.11.136 src port=2252
dst port=6667
Sep 8 11:41:04 tsec1-fw: src=10.10.29.167 dst=207.38.11.136 src port=2264
dst port=6667
Sep 8 11:41:07 tsec1-fw: src=10.10.29.167 dst=207.38.11.136 src port=2264
dst port=6667
Sep 8 11:41:13 tsec1-fw: src=10.10.29.167 dst=207.38.11.136 src port=2264
dst port=6667
Sep 8 11:41:27 tsec1-fw: src=10.10.29.167 dst=207.38.11.136 src port=2267
dst port=6667
Sep 8 11:41:30 tsec1-fw: src=10.10.29.167 dst=207.38.11.136 src port=2267
dst port=6667
Sep 8 11:41:36 tsec1-fw: src=10.10.29.167 dst=207.38.11.136 src port=2267
dst port=6667
Sep 8 11:41:48 tsec1-fw: src=10.10.29.167 dst=207.38.11.136 src port=2276
dst port=6667
```

More scripts a-go-go

A not-so-simple script to find clients with DNS issues
 % OutBoundDNS.pl fwlogs

10.21.54.119 = 4576 10.21.54.34 = 2522 10.10.215.127 = 2175it-206-dhcp-104 = 1797 ausy-dns01 = 106 dhcp61-194 = 55 dhcp147-236 = 40 dhcp101-46 = 30 uk1-192-ssr = 14 toast = 4 ZT075057.ppp.dion.ne.jp = 1

Detecting new websites that have never been visited before

Never before seen (nbs)

- Written by Marcus Ranum (http://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/index.html)
- Creates and manages a simple and fast database of strings that have been seen before
- Create a database

% nbsmk -d /var/tmp/neverseen

Now it is time to get to parsing

Test your perl-fu

- Our web proxies store all the info we need
- % cat proxylog | /usr/bin/perl -e 'while(\$line=<stdin>){if(\$line=~m/^.*\s(http\:\/\[\w\d\.\-_]+).*\$/){print "\$1\n";}}' > urilog
- Don't panic, we are just getting rid of cruft
- Now lets start training nbs

% cat urilog | nbs -d /var/tmp/neverseen

One month later . . .

Now that NBS is trained, we can scrutinize new URI's

% cat proxylog | /usr/bin/perl -e 'while(\$line=<stdin>) {if(\$line=~m/^.*\s(http\:\//[\w\d\.\-_]+).*\$/) {print "\$1\n";} }' | nbs -d /var/tmp/neverseen http://www.sun-herald.com http://www.saraevans.com http://www.comiczone.com http://www.physics.ubc.ca http://www.nieforth.com

Network traffic trends

- Remember Welchia/Nachi?
- Firewalls logs can be monitored/mined for trending
- Who is pinging what, when, how much and how long?

On an empty network you can ping forever

Destination IP Addresses



24 Hour Time Span

Every good presentation needs a pretty graph

"The frequency and relation of uninteresting events are interesting."
-Marcus Ranum

Firewall Log Analysis

24 Hour Time Span

Firewall Log Analysis (cont)

Destination Port



24 Hour Time Span

Firewall Log Analysis (cont)





24 Hour Time Span

Current/future research

- The wire spy (wsd)
 - This utility sniffs the network, building access control lists based on the traffic that is seen on the wire.
 - After training wsd, any added ACLs must be traffic that has not been seen before
- DNS statistical analysis to detect traffic blooms
 - Many systems searching for one(or few) new names
 - One(or few) systems searching for many new names

Questions?